Cardinality-constrained portfolio optimization with short selling and risk-neutral interest rate

Decisions in Economics and Finance - Short selling strategy leads to a portfolio with significantly better risk-return structure compared to the standard approach. Moreover, investors can use...     

Income shares,secular stagnation and the long-run distribution of wealth

Four alarming stylized facts have recently emerged in the United States: (a) a decline in the labor share of income; (b) a decline in labor productivity; (c) an increase in the top 1% wealth share and (d) an increase in the capital-income ratio. In Capital in the XXI Century, Thomas Piketty's argument is that the r > g inequality determines an increase in the capital-income ratio; if the elasticity of substitution in production is above one, the profit share rises. We provide a contrasting explanation that draws from the Post Keynesian approach to differential saving propensities between classes and the Classical-Marxian theory of induced technical change. In a simple model of “capitalists” and “workers,” we show that institutional changes that lower the labor share—declining unionization, increasing monopsony power in the labor market, the global ‘race to the bottom' in unit labor costs or the exhaustion of path-breaking scientific discoveries—can reduce labor productivity growth because of the lessened incentives to innovate to save on labor costs. A falling labor share reduces workers' total savings, and wealth concentrates in the capitalists' hands. A higher profit share and wealth share both put pressure on accumulation: but the long-run growth rate, which is anchored to labor productivity growth, has fallen. To restore balanced growth, the capital-income ratio must rise, independent of the elasticity of substitution. These tendencies are not inevitable: taxation can be used to implement any wealth distribution targeted by policymakers, while worker-crushing institutional arrangements can also in principle be reversed through policy. Neither change appears likely given the current institutional and global policy climate.     

Redistribution in a Neo‐Kaleckian Two‐country Model

We investigate the interaction between demand‐driven growth and income distribution in open economies, by combining expenditure‐switching and demand spillover effects in a neo‐Kaleckian two country model. First, we specify elasticities of wage share and real exchange rate to the money wage relative to labor productivity, in order to precisely describe the distributive pass‐through from money wages to the labor share and the real exchange rate. Second, we analyze the demand effects of an increase in the money wage for given labor productivity (a redistribution towards labor) in both Home and Foreign country, as well as globally. We derive closed form results for two identical countries. These results indicate that redistribution towards labor at Home: (i) always increases growth globally if Home is wage‐led, but can lead to lower growth at Home relative to Foreign; and (ii) will always imply lower growth at Home relative to Foreign if Home is profit‐led, but can still be growth‐enhancing at Home. Thus, to the extent that countries are concerned with their relative economic performance, a fallacy of composition can emerge. Numerical simulations suggest that these fallacies could indeed occur. As a consequence, ‘returns to coordination’ over international labor policies might be substantial.